The Model and Notations

The Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents. Let A = A 1 × . . . × A n be a set of alternatives. We assume, without loss of generality, that for all i, j ∈ N , A i = A j . Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ A be an alternative and 1 ≡ (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n . If alternative x is such that for all i, j ∈ N , x i = x j = α, then we denote x = α1. Next, let F ⊆ A be the set of feasible alternatives. If for all x ∈ F there exists α such that x = α1, then the set of feasible alternatives models a public goods economy. Otherwise, we model an economy with at least one private goods component. Hence, our model encompasses public and private goods economies.
To fix ideas, let us give two examples. It will be clear from these examples that given the set A of alternatives, the set F of feasible alternatives fully determines whether we are working with a public or a private goods model. Note that the Cartesian product notation we use for the set of alternatives is for notational convenience only; none of our results require it. Example 1. Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } × . . . × {a 1 , ..., a n }. Suppose that the agents have to choose one candidate out of the set {a 1 , . . . , a n } of possible candidates. Then, F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N, x i = x j }. On the other hand, if agents have to allocate the set of indivisible objects or tasks {a 1 , . . . , a n } among themselves, then F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N, x i = x j }.
Example 2. Let A = [0, 1] × . . . × [0, 1] . Suppose that the agents have to choose a single point in the interval [0,1] that everyone will consume without rivalry, e.g., a public facility on a street (see Moulin, 1980) . Then, F = {x ∈ A : for all i, j ∈ N, x i = x j }. On the other hand, if agents have to choose a division of one unit of an infinitely divisible good among themselves (see Sprumont, 1991) , then feasibility is determined by the size of the resource and F = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N, x i ≥ 0 and i∈N x i = 1}.
For all i ∈ N , agent i's preferences are represented by a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation R i over A i . As usual, for all x, y ∈ A, x i R i y i is interpreted as "i weakly prefers x to y", x i P i y i as "i strictly prefers x to y", and x i I i y i as "i is indifferent between x and y". Whenever our model captures a private goods component, we assume that agents only care about their own consumption and therefore, for all i ∈ N and all x, y ∈ A, we use the notation x R i y instead of x i R i y i .
For all i ∈ N , let R i = R be a set of preferences on A i . It is again without loss of generality that we assume that all agents have the same preference domain R. Let R N denotes the set of preference profiles R = (R i ) i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , R i ∈ R.
Let A, F , and R be given. Then, a rule ϕ is a function that assigns to every preference profile R ∈ R N a feasible alternative ϕ(R) ∈ F .
Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity
First,we discuss the incentive property strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent ever benefits from misrepresenting his preference relation. 1 For agent i ∈ N , preference profile R ∈ R, and preference relation R i ∈ R, we obtain preference profile (R i , R −i ) by replacing R i at R by R i .
Strategy-Proofness:
A rule ϕ is strategy-proof if for all R ∈ R N , all i ∈ N , and all R i ∈ R, ϕ(R) R i ϕ(R i , R −i ).
Next, we define monotonic transformations. Loosely speaking, for any alternative x and any preference profile R, if at a preference profile R all agents i ∈ N consider alternative x to be (weakly) better, then R is a monotonic transformation of R at x. For agent i ∈ N , preference relation R i ∈ R, and alternative x ∈ A, the lower contour set of
we denote the set of all monotonic transformations of R i at x and by M T (R, x) we denote the set of all monotonic transformations of R at x, i.e., R ∈ M T (R, x) if for all i ∈ N , R i ∈ M T i (R i , x). A rule ϕ is Maskin monotonic if an alternative x that is chosen at preference profile R is also chosen at a preference profile R where x is considered (weakly) better by all agents.
Maskin Monotonicity: A rule ϕ is Maskin monotonic if for all R, R ∈ R N , ϕ(R) = x and R ∈ M T (R, x) imply ϕ(R ) = x.
Well-Known Preference Domains
The General Arrovian Domain
We refer to the general domain of strict preferences as the Arrovian preference domain, i.e., R A is such that for all i ∈ N , all R i ∈ R, and all x i , y i ∈ A i , x i R i y i implies x i P i y i or x i = y i . Thus, the Cartesian product domain R N A equals the set of all possible linear orders on F .
One-Dimensional Single-Peaked and Single-Plateaued Preferences
Here we introduce the general single-peaked preference domain and several of its well-known subdomains. We start by defining the smallest domain we consider, the symmetric singlepeaked preference domain introduced in Border and Jordan (1983) . The domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences is induced by the Euclidean norm · .
Symmetric single-peaked preferences (Euclidean) on R:
By relaxing the symmetry assumption, one obtains the domain of single-peaked preferences introduced in Black (1948) and Moulin (1980) .
Single-peaked preferences on R: Preferences
We now introduce two superdomains of the single-peaked preference domain. First, consider again the location of a public facility in a street. As in Example 2 we assume that agents's preferences are single-peaked, but that in addition they have an outside option so that if the public facility is too far away, they will not use it. This class of preferences is introduced and analyzed by Cantala (2004) .
Single-peaked preferences on R with an outside option:
The second superdomain of the single-peaked domain frequently encountered in the literature (see Moulin, 1984) is the so-called single-plateaued domain. For such a domain, we allow agents to have an interval of best preferred points, so that instead of the peak we have a plateau.
Single-plateaued preferences on R: Preferences
Note that the definition above only allows for a unique plateau of best alternatives. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) , DHM for short, consider a more general singleplateaued domain (which they call the single-peaked domain) by allowing for additional plateaus left and right from the "top-plateau".
DHM single-plateaued preferences on R: Preferences
Figure 1 summarizes the set-relationship between the domains introduced so far introduced. In the figure, X → Y indicates that Y is a subset of X. 
DHM domain
Higher-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences
Here we introduce norm induced, 3 star-shaped, and general single-peaked preferences on R m . See Border and Jordan (1983) and Barberà et al. (1993) .
Euclidean preferences on R m : Preferences R i on A i ⊆ R m are Euclidean if there exists p(R i ) ∈ R n and R i has utility representation u i such that for all
Separable quadratic preferences on R m : Preferences R i on A i ⊆ R m are separable quadratic if there exist p(R i ) ∈ A i and α 1 , . . . , α n > 0, and R i has utility representation u i such that for all
Star-shaped preferences on R m : Preferences R i on a convex subset of A i ⊆ R m are starshaped if there exists a point p(R i ) ∈ A i such that for all x i ∈ A i \ {p(R i )} and all λ ∈ (0, 1),
3 Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness
Rich Domains: Monotonicity implies Strategy-Proofness
Let R i ∈ R. Then, by b(R i ) we denote agent i's best alternatives in A, i.e., b(R i ) := {x ∈ A : for all y ∈ A, x i R i y i }. To establish our first result, we introduce the following domain "richness" condition.
Condition R1: Let R i ∈ R and x, y ∈ A such that y P i x. Then, there exists
Remark 1. Note that Condition R1 is different from Dasgupta et al.'s (1979) or Fleurbaey and Maniquet's (1997) richness conditions. Our condition involves one preference relation R i while the other two richness conditions are based on conditions involving two preference relations R i and R i . The domain richness condition closest to ours seems to be the one introduced by Le Breton and Zaporozhets (2006) . We discuss the relation between these richness conditions in more detail in Appendix A.
Examples of rich domains satisfying Condition R1 are Moulin's (1980) single-peaked preference domain on R, the single-plateaued domains we have introduced, Arrow's general domain, and star-shaped domains (Barberà et al., 1993) . We will consider all domains introduced above in Section 5. Theorem 1. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy condition R1 and let rule ϕ be defined on R N . If ϕ is monotonic, then ϕ is strategy-proof.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is monotonic, but not strategy-proof. Then, there exist R ∈ R N , i ∈ N , andR i ∈ R such that ϕ(R i , R −i )P i ϕ(R). Denote ϕ(R) = x and ϕ(R i , R −i ) = y. Hence, y P i x and by Condition R1 there exists R i ∈ R such that y ∈ b(R i ) and
Hence, x = y; contradicting our assumption that y P i x.
Let R satisfy condition R1 and let rule ϕ be defined on R N . We demonstrate for the public as well as for the private goods case that strategy-proofness does not necessarily imply monotonicity.
Example 3. We consider Moulin's (1980) It is easy to see that ϕ is strategy-proof, but not monotonic.
Example 4. We consider Sprumont's (1991) model as introduced in Example 2. Thus, for all i ∈ N , A i = [0, 1] and F = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N, x i ≥ 0 and i∈N x i = 1}. For simplicity, assume that there are three agents. Let c 1 ∈ (0, 1). Then for all R ∈ R N ,
It is easy to see that ϕ is strategy-proof, but not monotonic.
Restricted Domains: Strategy-Proofness implies Monotonicity
For agent i ∈ N , preference relation R i ∈ R i , and alternative x ∈ A, the upper contour set of R i at x is U i (R i , x) ≡ {y ∈ A : y i R i x i }. To establish our second result, we introduce the following domain "restriction" condition.
Theorem 2. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R2 and let rule ϕ be defined on R N . If ϕ is strategy-proof, then ϕ is monotonic.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is strategy-proof, but not monotonic. Then, there exist R, R ∈ R N such that R ∈ M T (R, x), ϕ(R) = x and ϕ(R ) = y = x. Assume that R = (R i , R −i ) for some i ∈ N . By strategy-proofness, x R i y and y R i x. Thus, y ∈ L i (R i , x) and y ∈ U i (R i , x).
Let R satisfy Condition R2 and let rule ϕ be defined on R N .We demonstrate for the public as well as for the private goods case that monotonicity does not necessarily imply strategy-proofness.
Example 5. We consider Moulin's (1980) model as described in Examples 2 and 3, but with symmetrically single-peaked preferences. Let c 1 ∈ (0, 1). Then, for all R ∈ R N ,
It is easy to see that ϕ is monotonic, but not strategy-proof.
Example 6. We consider Sprumont's (1991) model discussed in Examples 2 and 4, but with symmetrically single-peaked preferences. Let c 1 ∈ (0, 1). Then for all R ∈ R N ,
Which Domains are Rich and which are Restricted?
Condition R1: Rich Domains
It is clear from Examples 5 and 6 that domains of Euclidean single-peaked preferences violate condition R1. We will show below that the star-shaped domain is rich. Since the singlepeaked preference domain is the one-dimensional equivalent of star-shaped preferences, our result will imply that any domain larger than the single-peaked preference domain is also rich.
Proposition 1. Let A and F be given. The domain R of star-shaped preferences satisfies condition R1.
Condition R2: Restricted Domains
If R equals the set of all linear orders on A, then Condition R2 is satisfied (in particular in the Arrovian model where A is finite and all linear orders are admissible, preferences satisfy Condition R2). Before going to our next result, let us introduce some additional definitions. An ordering R i on A i ⊂ R m is said to be induced by a strictly convex norm if (i) there exists a peak p(R i ) ∈ A i and a metric δ on R m such that for all
, and (ii) δ is induced by a strictly convex norm · , i.e., for all
Proposition 2. Preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm satisfy Condition R2.
Examples of preferences induced by a convex norm for A = R m are Euclidean (symmetric) and separable quadratic preferences.
Corollary 1. Assume that all preferences in R are induced by a strictly convex norm and let rule ϕ be defined on R N . If ϕ is strategy-proof, then ϕ is monotonic. Condition R1*: For all x, y ∈ A such that x i = y i , and all R i , R i ∈ R, there exists
Obviously if R satisfies Condition R1*, it also satisfies Condition R1.
Theorem 3. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R1* and let rule ϕ be defined on R N . Then, ϕ is Maskin monotonic if and only if ϕ is constant.
Proof. Obviously, any constant rule is Maskin monotonic. For the only if part, pick i ∈ N , x, y ∈ A, x i = y i and R, R ∈ R N with R = (R i , R −i ) and such that ϕ(R) = x and ϕ(R ) = y. By Condition R1*, there exists R = (R i , R −i ) ∈ R N such that R i ∈ M T i (R, x) and R i ∈ M T i (R , y). By Maskin monotonicity, we obtain that x = y; contradicting x i = y i .
Equipped with this result, we have several immediate corollaries. To state the first corollary we define efficiency of a rule.
Efficiency: A rule ϕ is efficient if for all R ∈ R N , there exists no y ∈ F such that for all i ∈ N , y R i ϕ(R) and for some j ∈ N , y P j ϕ(R).
Corollary 4. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R1*. Then, no Maskin monotonic rule on R N is efficient.
Next, observe that on the domain of single-plateaued preferences, in the proof of Theorem 3, instead of using Condition R1*, R i can be directly chosen such that [p(
Corollary 5. Let A and F be given. Let R be the single-plateaued domain. Then, any Maskin monotonic rule ϕ defined on R N is constant.
Finally, for all i ∈ N , the flat preference relation R f i is such that for all x i , y i ∈ A i , x i I i y i . Note that any domain R that contains the flat indifference map R f i for some i ∈ N satisfies Condition R1*. For any such domain, R i = R f i can be used in the proof of Theorem 3. Hence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 6. Let A be an (finite or infinite) ordered set of alternatives, and R be given. Then a Maskin monotonic rule ϕ defined on R N is constant if and only if for some i ∈ N , R f i ∈ R.
The preceding corollaries rest on the simple observation that the single-plateaued domain and any of its superdomains contain the flat indifference map. A similar conclusion is obtained in Berga and Moreno (2007) . On the other hand, the single peaked with outside option domain and any of its subdomains escape the negative conclusion of Theorem 3.
A Appendix: Richness Conditions
First, we introduce Dasgupta et al.'s (1979) richness condition. A domain is (Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin) rich if it satisfies the following condition.
Condition DHM: Let R i , R i ∈ R and a, b ∈ A such that (a) a R i b ⇒ a R i b and (b) a P i b ⇒ a P i b. Then, there exists R i ∈ R such that (i) R i ∈ M T i (R i , a) and (ii) R i ∈ M i (R i , b). Maskin (1985) called the Dasgupta et al. (1979) rich domain monotonically closed. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) also use a domain richness condition under the name of strict monotonic closedness. Their rich domain satisfies the following condition.
Condition FM: Let R i , R i ∈ R and a, b ∈ A such that (a) a P i b. Then, there exists R i ∈ R such that (i) R i ∈ M T i (R i , b) (ii) R i ∈ M i (R i , a), and (iii) [not a I i b].
Note that Conditions R and F M are logically independent. The domain of singleplateaued preferences on R is rich according to Condition R, but not according to Condition F M (on the single-plateaued domain it might not be possible to satisfy FM(iii)). On the other hand, strictly monotonic domains satisfying Condition FM do not satisfy Condition R.
Finally we consider Le Breton and Zaporozhets's (2006) rich domain condition.
Condition LBZ: Let R i ∈ R and x, y ∈ A such that y P i x and there existsR i ∈ R such that b(R i ) = {y} . Then, there exists R i ∈ R such that b(R i ) = {y} and for all z = x such that x R i z, xP i )z.
